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Introduction 
The Society of Jesus was no stranger to missionary work in foreign and 
distant places.  Founded in 1540,1 the Society of Jesus, or the Jesuits, rivaled, 
even eclipsed, all of the more established religious orders in global missionary 
work: mainly the Order of St. Dominic, or the Dominicans; the Order of St. 
Francis, or the Franciscans; and the Order of St. Augustine, or the Augustinians.  
By the late sixteenth century, the Society already had mission stations in the 
Americas and India, and already had a presence in Japan and China.  Their 
success in missionary work had been nothing short of extraordinary.   
The Jesuits had a military-like organization.  Owing to the background of 
their founder Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), who was a soldier of noble birth,2 
the Jesuits, more than any of the other orders, were men of action.  They did 
highly value their spiritual exercises but at the same time, they also maintained 
that communication with god, and the perfection of their relationship with him 
could also “be attained by the exercise of the natural human capacities.”3  In 
contrast, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Augustinians, having been 
founded in the thirteenth century, were rather devoted to the hermetic way of life; 
and for them, preaching the gospel to non-believers was simply secondary to their 
lives of contemplative prayers.  Additionally, the very nature of their 
evangelization seemed to be geared toward a heavy-handed rebuke of what they 
considered to be heresies and idolatries.  Their approach to evangelization was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Paul Van Dyke, Ignatius Loyola: The Founder of the Jesuits (Port Washington: 
2 Ibid., 14-28.!
3 Rene Fülöp-Miller, The Jesuits: A History of the Society of Jesus (New York: Capricorn 
Books, 1963), 4. 
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one of the castigation and extirpation of these heresies.  In not so many words, 
their method of proselytization was simple and clear – their Christian god was the 
one true god, and their Catholic Church the one true church; non-Christian deities 
were merely condemned as idols, and other religious traditions mere heresies.  
The Jesuits, however, were tolerant of other religious traditions, realizing that this 
was the most effective way to penetrate tightly knit societies and be able to preach 
and ultimately convert people to Christianity.  Diplomacy and accommodation in 
dealing with non-Christians became integral features of their evangelization work.  
This was not at all surprising as social interaction and community service were 
important parts of their formation as members of the Society; these activities 
served as extensions of their personal prayers and spiritual meditations.  This 
aspect of their missionary activity was most evidently demonstrated in their 
missions in China, Japan, and Vietnam.  
In the Philippines, meanwhile, the presence of a Spanish colonial 
infrastructure demanded more than just mere diplomacy and accommodation.  
Exigent circumstances in the islands – state administration, civil and ecclesiastical 
conflicts, native pacifications and conversions, internal disagreements among the 
religious, among others – meant that community action had to assume a more 
radical guise – that of political maneuverings and strategies.   
But ‘politics’ and ‘to be political’ have meant different things in different 
situations.  Indeed, the word, ‘politics’, has been used to describe anything from 
affairs of state to inter-office relations.  In this study, ‘politics’ refers to the 
alliances the Jesuits crafted with colonial powers and the tactics they employed to 
! 3!
either gain or maintain such alliances.  It will also contextualize the term, 
establishing parameters for our usage of the word that is essential in 
understanding the argument and the support presented herein.  
This contextual meaning of politics is historically placed in Counter 
Reformation Europe.  The Society of Jesus was founded at a time when the 
Catholic Church realized the exigent need for change to stem the spread of 
Protestantism, and to adapt to the growth of humanist values.  To these pressing 
concerns, the Church responded with measures to reform its organization, 
demonstrating an intention to  accommodate progressive ideals, and a willingness 
to discuss and question traditional Catholic doctrines.4  The Society of Jesus, in its 
establishment and formation, therefore, took into consideration the prevailing 
reformist ideals in the period, but simultaneously, acknowledged the structures of 
the Catholic Church and the restrictions it imposed on its members.  Between this 
legacy of conformity and this new idea of self expression, the members of the 
order found “wiggle room” for agency, discovered a middle-ground, a 
comfortable compromise.  Politics, therefore, at least in the Jesuit sense, meant a 
form of agency that interacted with the powers of colonial governments.  They 
may, in some instances, have overstepped in the execution of these expressions, 
but as we shall discuss in the following paragraphs, the Jesuit moral code 
provided a license for incursions into questionable extra-ecclesiastical regions.5   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Eugene F. Rice, Jr. and Anthony Grafton, The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 
1460-1559, 2nd Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1970), 171-173. 
5 Carlos Roy Aramayo. “2000 In Finibus Terrae: Alonso Sánchez and the Limits of 
Intellectual Autonomy,” The Free Library (January 1), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/In Finibus 
Terrae: Alonso Sánchez and the limits of intellectual...-a0122767914 (accessed May 04 2014). !
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Acting as ‘politicians’, the Jesuits have assumed the positions of advisors 
to heads of nations, confessors to kings and emperors, teachers to future rulers, 
state representatives, ambassadors, power brokers, and personal confidantes.  
These roles did not require the members of the order to directly effect policy, 
instead they provided the perfect avenue to influence policy makers.  Through 
holding these offices, the Jesuits have successfully married their adherence to 
structure and tradition and their espousal of agency and humanist ideals.   
The use of politics among the Jesuits should not come as a surprise despite 
the religious nature of the order.  In fact, the moral philosophy of the Society, 
although not explicit about it, condoned the use of politics by its members:  
The Jesuits now hold the view that in many instances, a good 
intention can justify even the choice of less good means.  They 
contend that, in the abstract, man’s moral consciousness is 
certainly primarily disposed to regard the application of immoral 
means to a moral end as essentially to be condemned; in practical 
life, however, innumerable instances, have, over and over again, 
tended to lead to the opposite conclusion.  How often does it not 
happen that we are compelled to tell a lie to avoid injuring 
someone, and it is easy to conceive of a case in which a lie might 
be the means of saving a person’s life.6  
 
 This political exposition becomes clearer and more precise: “… man’s 
moral consciousness may place the ultimate purpose of an act on a higher plane 
than the means by which it is attained.”7  In essence, for the Society, the end did 
justify the means.  This notion of Jesuit moral philosophy may have different 
interpretations depending on the reader.  But one thing is consistently gleaned, 
even extracted, from this short discourse – that political calculations, understood 
in the Jesuit sense, is an acceptable, moral tool in community and social relations, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Fülöp-Miller, The Jesuits: A History of the Society of Jesus, 151. 
7 Ibid.!
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or state relations at large, for the members of the Society of Jesus.  Thus, in 
evangelization and for the survival of the Society of Jesus as a religious order, a 
more delicate and sensitive approach to missionary work – the employment of a 
political agenda – was more than necessary; it was practically essential.         
The Jesuits, therefore, were a new breed of missionaries, very different 
from what the Catholic community had seen in the past.  The very reason for their 
establishment was to help reform the same institution responsible for their 
founding.  And yet, when they were established, the legacy of regulation and 
censure still very much pervaded the Catholic Church.  This rather circuitous 
origin of the order provided them with a measure of liberation from the 
constraints of strict adherence to rules and dogmatic principles, but at the same 
time, placed them at the center of the institution from where all these authority 
and control originate.  As such, this paper focuses on how, under these 
circumstances, this new breed of Catholic evangelists existed, adapted, survived, 
and even flourished.  Throughout this paper, I argue that the Jesuits positioned 
themselves, at least during this period, in that middle ground of adherence to 
tradition and expressions of political agency, a middle ground between the 
Catholic Church’s dogmatic teachings and the emerging humanist values that 
increasingly became more important and influential in this period; and that 
expressions of this compromise were demonstrated in the Jesuits’ political 
activities to the extent that both traditional Catholic doctrines were respected and 
pragmatic virtues were integrated and applied.  This new sense of agency reached 
its fullest expression as the Jesuits assumed the roles of advisors, government 
! 6!
agents, counselors, confessors, ambassadors, brokers, and other offices that 
require less than direct involvement in non-ecclesiastical affairs.  This essentially 
was true for the Jesuits’ political activity in the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries – existing within the broader traditions of the Catholic 
Church, but working toward the acceptance and application of humanist ideals in 
response to an age where the interconnectedness of people, continents, and 
religious were becoming more important and more apparent.  
In the succeeding discussion, I elaborate on how Jesuit understanding of 
their contemporary surroundings made them realize the importance to adapt 
politically, and to employ political machinations to survive in a constantly 
changing world.  The following section is divided into three parts: the first part 
concerns Alonso Sánchez, a very talented, and persuasive Jesuit who gave 
legitimacy to Spanish colonial claims over the Philippine islands, and its 
succeeding occupation; the second part is about Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, a 
governor general of the islands, who found himself embroiled in bitter disputes 
with church officials but also found friends and allies among the Jesuit fathers; 
and the third part looks at the Jesuit expulsion from the Philippines, which 
showed the involvement of international developments in colonial cities.  This 
paper demonstrates how Jesuit political activity and skill were manifested – using 
these three examples – first, as an active and vocal participant, in the colonial 
process, second, as a supporting element in colonial politics, and lastly, as an 
organization defending itself against external and internal threats.  Strikingly 
different, yet equally effective, these political strategies yielded much benefit to 
! 7!
the Jesuits, from their arrival in the Philippines in 1581 up to their expulsion from 
the Spanish Empire in 1768.  
 
Historiography 
 The history of the Jesuits in the Philippines remains understudied in the 
historiography of the global Catholic Church history.  As such, there are only five 
main studies of the history of the order in the Philippines.  In 1939, W.C. Repetti 
edited a three-volume tome called the History of the Society of Jesus in the 
Philippine Islands.8  Primarily relying on information found in the archives in 
Seville, he carefully reconstructed the events pertaining to the order in the 
Philippines for the last three hundred years.  The last extensive work on the order 
was The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768,9 published in 1967.  The author, 
Horacio de la Costa, himself a Jesuit, naturally had an agenda in writing this 
book.  Purging it of a lot of non-religious elements, he attempted to paint the 
history of his order using exclusively religious hues.  The result was essentially a 
history of the missionary work of the Jesuits, and not a history of the Jesuits as an 
institution, as products of the tension between tradition and progress, between 
allegiance to the king and obedience to the pope, and between their moral 
responsibility to spread Christianity and their humanist value to respect the rights 
of the natives.  It seemed de la Costa was conscious of this purging, for the 
sources he referenced made some mention of the non-religious activities of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 W.C., Repetti, History of the Society of Jesus in the Philippine Islands (Caloocan City: 
Good Shepherd Press, 1938). 
9 Horacio de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines 1581-1768 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967).!
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order.  These two works comprise the secondary sources exclusively dedicated to 
the history of the order in the country. 
Many of the materials still used date from the early modern period.  
Claudio Acquaviva, the Society’s general in 1590, cognizant of the importance of 
meticulous record keeping and documentation, instructed the Jesuits in the 
Philippines to chronicle the activities of the order for posterity.10   The result was 
a three-volume comprehensive history of the order, spanning the years 1582-
1716.  The first one was Pedro Chirino’s Relacion de las Islas Filipinas y de lo 
que en ellas han trabajado los padres de la Compañia de Jesus, published in 
1604.  In 1660, in response to a request of Philip IV11, Francisco Cólin published 
his work in 1663 under the title, Labor Evangélica, ministerios apostólicos de los 
obreros de la Compañia de Jesús.  Fundación y progresos de su provincia en las 
Islas Filipinas.12  And lastly, in 1749, Pedro Murillo Velarde published Historia 
de la Provincia de Filipinas de la Compañia de Jesús, Segunda Parte, que 
comprehende los progresos de esta provincia desde el año de 1616 hasta el de 
1716.13  Murillo’s work “is a continuation of Labor Evangelica…, which at the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Pedro Chirino, Relacion de las Islas Filipinas y de lo que en ellas han trabajado los 
padres de la Compañia de Jesus, 2nd Ed., (1604, repr., Manila: Imprenta de D. Esteban Balbas, 
1890), 5.  Chirino wrote: “Habiendo de dar cuenta a V.P. del estado y punto, en que esta nuestra 
minima Compañia en las Filipinas (por la obligacion de mi oficio de Procurador, enviago para esto 
el Julio pasado de seiscientos dos y como persona que he gastado en ellas catorce años de lo mejor 
de mi vida,) seguiré el hilo de los sucesos que la Compañia ha tenido en aquellas partes; y de los 
trabajos que ha pasado en la predicacion de nuestra santa fe, y del aumento que la misma 
Compañia ha recibido a vueltas del que ha procurado para la Santa Iglesia.” 
11 Eduardo Descalzo Yuste, “Las Crónicas Jesuíticas de Filipinas en el Siglo XVIII: 
Pedro Murillo Velarde,” Líneas recientes de investigación en Historia Moderna. I Encuentro de 
Jóvenes Investigadores en Historia Moderna. (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Catolico, 2013) 
234. 12!Francisco Cólin, Labor Evangelica, ed. Pablo Pastells (Madrid: Joseph Fernandez de 
Buendia, 1663).!
13 Pedro Murillo Velarde, S.J. Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañia de 
Jesús. 2nd parte  (Manila: Nic de la Cruz Bagay, 1749). 
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time built on the unedited, unpublished Chirino work, Primera Parte de la 
Historia de la Provincia de Filipinas de al Compañia de Jesús.  Thus, Murillo 
Velarde’s work completes the official chronicle of the first phase of the history of 
the Society of Jesus in the Philippines.”14  These three works are the most cited on 
the topic of the Jesuits in the Philippines.  Although each had its bias, they are, 
nonetheless, significant in that they were written when the country was still a 
colony of Spain, giving the reader first-hand observations on how state and 
church relations, both with each other and within itself, affected colonial 
administration.  
 These five volumes are the principal sources for the history of the Society 
of Jesus in the Philippines.  Although written by members of the order with a 
specific purpose in mind, the information contained therein provides the 
contextual backdrop for this work.  Further, the information they do not provide 
or deliberately withhold ascribes purpose and a measure of urgency to this 
research.  Focusing on the political aspects of Jesuit activities in the Philippines, 
this paper aims to demonstrate a gap in the literature, while simultaneously filling 
that gap with original research and persuasive exposition.    
  Few, if any, comprehensive works have been published on the subject 
since de la Costa’s The Jesuits in the Philippines.  If there were any, most of them 
were either book chapter contributions or journal articles.  Apart from Repetti’s 
work, all other histories of the Jesuits have been written by members of the order, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Yuste, Líneas recientes, 238.  Yuste wrote: “La Historia es la continuación de la Labor 
Evangélica del P. Francisco Cólin (1663), que a su vez retomaba la inédita Primera Parte de la 
Historia de la Provincia de Filipinas de la Compañia de Jesús de P. Pedro Chirino.  Así pues, la 
obra de Murillo Velarde completa la crónica oficial de la Compañia de Jesús en Filipinas en su 
primera etapa en Filipinas.”!
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which necessarily colors the narrative favorably to the Jesuits.  This paper seeks 
to provide a different perspective, specifically an angle of non-Jesuit provenance, 
on the long history of the order in the islands. 
 
Early Spanish Philippines 
When Miguel Lopez de Legazpi founded the first Spanish settlement in 
the island of Cebu in 1565, he not only affirmed Spain’s temporal dominion over 
what would be the Philippine Islands, but he also established the Catholic 
Church’s spiritual mission to spread Catholicism throughout the region.  As the 
representative of the king of Spain, Legazpi, who later became the first governor 
of the islands, embodied in him both political and ecclesiastical powers, as well as 
the responsibilities that accompany such an office.  With that in mind, the 
Philippines became just as much part of Christendom, as it was part of the 
Spanish Empire.15  
This duality in authority and purpose was in accordance with the 
agreement struck between the king of Spain and the Pope, known as patronato 
real or royal patronage.  Historian Charles Cunningham, quoting from 
Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias, described it as an arrangement 
whereby the pope assigns to the Spanish king the right to nominate candidates to 
church offices, to assign provinces to missionary orders, and to confirm junior 
religious appointments.  In exchange the Spanish government sees to the well-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Nicholas P. Cushner, Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution (Quezon 
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1971), 74-75. 
! 11!
being, and safety of all church personnel.16  As a result, royal patronage provided 
for the inextricable collaboration of the church and state in Spain’s colonies.17 
Indeed, this was the defining characteristic of Spanish imperialism – a kind of 
imperialism that went beyond the pursuit of national prestige and economic gain, 
a kind of imperialism that promoted European civilization through the spread of 
Catholicism, over than a mere annexation of foreign territories, and a subjugation 
of native inhabitants.       
 This kind of imperialism differed greatly from British or Dutch 
imperialism.  It even differed with Portuguese imperialism where, although 
spreading the Catholic faith was considered of great importance, its primary 
purpose was to identify new sources for materials and markets for its domestically 
made goods; Portuguese imperialism did not seek to supplant the culture of the 
lands they conquered.  Spanish imperialism, as hinted above, not only imposed 
Spanish culture on the lands they politically annexed, but they also sought to 
establish Catholicism as the only religion in the empire, and at the very beginning 
of each conquest, enlisted the support of the Catholic Church in its colonial 
enterprise.18  
Under this colonial framework, the religious orders of the Catholic Church 
established themselves in the Philippines.  The Augustinians, who came with 
Legazpi in 1565, achieved much success in converting the natives to Christianity.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
              16 Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias, 1-6-1 to 7.  As cited in Charles Henry 
Cunningham, The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as Illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila 
(1583-1800), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919, 3623-365.!17!Horacio de la Costa, “Church and State in the Philippines during the Administration of 
Bishop Salazar, 1581-1594,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug., 
1950): 319.!
18 Cushner, Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution, 3-4. 
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In 1573, Guido de Lavezares, Legazpi’s successor as governor, wrote to Philip II 
requesting more missionaries, especially Jesuit missionaries, to be sent to the 
islands.19  The Spanish Crown responded by instructing religious personnel from 
other orders to come to the aid of the Augustinians in the Philippines: in 1578, the 
Franciscans arrived; in 1581, the first group of Jesuits; in 1587, the Dominicans; 
and finally, in 1606, the Augustinian Recollects.20   
To this chronology of religious mission establishment, however, an 
important caveat should be mentioned concerning the Jesuits.  Although they 
arrived in the Philippines in 1581, a permanent Jesuit mission was not established 
until 1590.  That first Jesuit mission was an exploratory mission to assess the 
practicality of establishing an active mission in the islands, “to be of assistance to 
the Spaniards there, and after familiarizing themselves with the conditions in that 
region, send back a report.”21  With the existence of Jesuit missions in nearby 
Macau and Moluccas, the economics of maintaining three locations in the region 
was a concern for the Society’s headquarters in Rome.  Additionally, Jesuit 
superiors maintained that an exploratory study was normal for possible new Jesuit 
mission stations: “… these priests came to this land to see and consider the 
opportunity that may present itself here, and to determine the merit of sending 
missionaries, as is customary for us before establishing a permanent mission…”22  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Cólin, Labor Evangelica, 1:166 note 3.  Cólin-Pastells wrote: “Gran necesidad en estas 
partes de rreligiosos [sic], franciscanos, dominicos y teatinos y algunos clerigos para la conversion 
destos naturales en especial los teatinos.” (NOTE: Lavezares mistakenly called the Jesuits 
‘teatinos,’ as indicated by Cólin-Pastell). 
20 John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino 
Responses, 1565-1700 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 32. 
21 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 5.  (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa) 22!Cólin-Pastells, Labor Evangelica, 1:351 note 1.  Cólin-Pastells wrote: “… estos padres 
binieron a esta tierra a ber y considerar la oportunidad que en ella puede aber para que la compañia 
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However, if one were to look at Jesuit missionary activities globally, the 
events in Spanish America may have also dictated this cautious approach from the 
Jesuit order.  The failure of the Jesuit mission in what is now Florida may have 
influenced this Jesuit policy of gradual introduction.  Indeed, there were Jesuit 
successes in Goa, parts of Japan, and even Macau, but these were all with the 
Portuguese or with the Italian.  The Florida mission was their first partnership 
with the Spanish.  That mission quickly turned sour and eventually failed, for the 
Jesuits witnessed firsthand how the Spaniards mistreated the natives of that land, 
and the results that brought.  In what was supposed to be an evangelizing mission, 
hostilities and outright violence between the natives and the Spaniards became 
commonplace, essentially endangering Jesuit missionary work.  And the Jesuits 
were quick to point out the reason: “Those missionaries with some experience in 
La Florida quickly came to believe that the greatest impediment to their work was 
not climate, Indians, or native priests, but their fellow Spaniards who antagonized 
even friendly Indians for seemingly little reason.”23  As a result of this failed 
Florida mission with Spain, the Jesuits were reluctant to work with the Spaniards.  
The innate pride and haughtiness that the Spanish brought – Spanish hubris, a 
mentality that led them to believe that regardless of their stations in the old 
country they were all hidalgos, or noblemen, in the New World and the Indies – 
to the missions were essentially condemning the evangelization process to fail 
before it even started.  Consequently, what followed in the Philippines was a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
haga asiento y embie religiosos segun questa orden lo tiene de costumbre antes de hazer asiento de 
proposito…”!
23 Charlotte M. Gradie, “Spanish Jesuits in Virginia: The Mission That Failed,” The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 96, No. 2 (Apr. 1988): 140-145.  (Translated 
from Spanish by Gradie)!
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decade-long feasibility study of the advantages and disadvantages of establishing 
a permanent mission in the new Spanish colony, of working with the Spanish 
once again, and perhaps, of putting stock in the belief that Spanish conquistadores 
learned some lessons from their failed Florida mission.  
This controlled and careful approach of the Jesuits demonstrated their 
understanding of the importance, and their use of a strategic approach to their 
missionary activities in the early modern period, a period marked by the struggle 
between traditional Catholic doctrines and humanist ideals.  Against the 
background of exploration and colonization, these missionaries realized the 
indispensability of a well-laid out plan and a calculated strategy to achieve their 
goals, and of course, the importance of learning from past experiences, while 
furthering a Christianization agenda.  Indeed, their exercise of prudence in 
establishing mission stations revealed an almost heretical acceptance that faith 
alone does not suffice.  If it did, they, like the other missionary orders, would 
have blindly established their mission and proceeded to interact, communicate, 
and convert the native inhabitants of the islands without regard to language, 
culture and the many other factors that complicate the realities of the period.   
The members of the Society of Jesus not only brought with them a fervent 
conviction to spread Christianity throughout the globe, but they also brought with 
them a praxis-oriented training that helped them in their missionary activities.  If 
they entered the Society as a young man, they were educated, conditioned, and 
trained to be able to contribute to these apostolic endeavors.  If they joined the 
Society as adults, they were already lawyers, theologians, educators, soldiers, and 
! 15!
mathematicians, among others.  They were practical, just as much as they were 
spiritual.24  “Their vocation was to a mixed life, a life of action as well as 
contemplation, in which prayer, to use a phrase of Nadal’s (one of the first 
Jesuits), ‘reached out to the external work.’”25 
The first Jesuit mission to the Philippines consisted of four members: 
Antonio Sedeño, Alonso Sánchez, both priests, Gaspar Suarez de Toledo, a 
scholastic, and Nicolas Gallardo, a lay brother.  However, nine days after the 
group set out for their voyage across the Pacific, Suarez de Toledo was stricken 
with a burning fever and died nine days later.26 
We now turn to Alonso Sánchez (1547-1593).  The following section 
focuses on him and his indispensible contribution to the colonial process toward 
the end of the sixteenth century. 
 
Alonso Sánchez 
In 1579, Alonso Sánchez arrived in Mexico as part of a group of talented 
and capable Jesuit fathers from Spain.  Even in that select company, Astráin, the 
historian of the Spanish provinces of the Society of Jesus, described Sánchez as 
standing “head and shoulders above them all by reason of his talent, and also by 
reason of his peculiar personality.”27  He was of sound peasant stock who took to 
athletics and singing popular ballads in his earlier years.  In 1565, at the age of 
twenty, he entered the Society in Alcalá as a novice.  He completed his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Fülöp-Miller, The Jesuits: A History of the Society of Jesus, 474-476. 
25 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 7.  (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa) 
26 Ibid., 5. 
27 Ibid., 6.  (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa) 
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theological studies with great distinction, and in 1571, was ordained to the 
priesthood.  It was during this time that Sánchez exhibited peculiarities in his 
behavior.  He began to extend his hours of prayer, and to withdraw from the 
social activities of the Society.  His predilection to solitude and dedication to 
prayer earned him the nickname, “medio Cartujo” – almost a Carthusian.28  When 
he was sent to Mexico, Sánchez’s superiors ordered him to abandon his life of 
semi-retirement, and occupy himself with preaching and hearing confessions, and 
other community outreach ministries.  Claudio Acquaviva, the Society’s general, 
once remarked: “any method of prayer which does not incline the soul to action 
and the ministries of our vocation in the service of God and the salvation and 
perfection of our fellow men may cause great harm to the institute of the Society 
and should be looked upon as a delusion, inasmuch as it is outside of and alien to 
the grace and purpose which God our Lord has given to the Society.”29  He 
obeyed without protestation.  Upon seeing his obedience and deference, his 
superiors elevated him to rector of the college of San Gerónimo at Puebla.  It was 
here that Sánchez received his order to travel to the Philippines as part of the first 
group of Jesuit missionaries.  Before he left, however, his immediate superior, 
Father Juan de la Plaza, expressed reasonable fears of Sánchez regressing back to 
his hermetical life if an ocean was placed between them.  Sánchez responded with 
a written statement to Plaza, promising him that he would continue to exercise the 
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28 Ibid.!
29 Ibid., 71-72.  (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa) 
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community outreach ministries of the Society under penalty of being labeled as 
not a real Jesuit.30   
However, Sánchez, to his core, detested conventional missionary and 
educational work.  He strongly disliked ecclesiastical activities, opting instead to 
participate in the world of secular politics.  He wrote in 1583 that the Jesuits 
should “engage in political work in favor of the king in order to win as much of 
his esteem…”31  Sánchez further rationalized his predilection for politics by 
explaining the benefits that a political alliance may bring to the Society.  He saw 
it as an exchange of favors: the Jesuits would assist in the Spanish monarchy’s 
imperial ambitions, and in return, the Crown would grant the Jesuits royal rights 
to the conversion of the subjugated people.32  Sánchez would soon enough find 
the opportunity to exercise and demonstrate his political acumen, for he would be 
sharing the long voyage from Mexico to the Philippines with the future 
archbishop of Manila.   
 Sánchez sailed to the Philippines with a rather large contingent of 
religious personnel, eighteen Augustinians, six Franciscans, and most importantly, 
Domingo de Salazar, a Dominican, who had already received his orders to be the 
first bishop of the Philippines.  In that voyage, Sánchez apparently made a 
favorable impression on Salazar, especially after the former delivered a sermon to 
the passengers, so much so that even before the end of the journey, Salazar was 
already consulting the Jesuit “on the quality and quantity of his prayer, his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Ibid., 7. 
31 AGI, Patronato, Sánchez to Father General, 22 June 1584, 25, R, 20 (1). In Aramayo. 
2000 In Finibus Terrae. 
32 Augustin Churruca Pelaez, Primeras fundaciones Jesuitas en Nueva Espana (Mexico 
City: Porua, 1980), 365.  In Aramayo. 2000 In Finibus Terrae. 
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penances, his diet and apparel, the conduct of his household, and the discharge of 
duties as bishop.”33  This was the first demonstration of Sánchez’s extraordinary 
gift as counselor and advisor, and at the same time, a presaging of the role he will 
be playing in the colonial politics.     
 When they reached the Philippines, the islands already began to exhibit 
early signs of Spanish colonial society: the seat of colonial government was along 
Calle Real; not far from it, a humble parish church that would, in a few years, rise 
to be a cathedral; Spanish noble ladies peeking out of their carriage windows; 
Spanish civil guards, ambling through the dirt streets; peninsulares and insulares; 
mestizos and mestizas; the principalia, the native ruling class; and the common 
people, all carrying on with their businesses.  With the Spanish colonial enterprise 
seemingly chugging along in the islands, and the anticipated growth of the 
Catholic community, Philip II gave the order to establish the Philippine diocese in 
1581.34  Domingo de Salazar, who came with the first group of Jesuits from 
Mexico, assumed the role of the first Bishop of Manila.35 
The Philippines despite its exterior calm, posed complications that 
authorities in Spain and Mexico were trying to understand and address: 1) the 
Philippines’ distance from both Spain and Mexico presented challenges over its 
effective administration; 2) the maintenance of the Philippines as a colony was a 
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33 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 9.  (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa)!
34 Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (1609; repr., Mexico City: Fondo de 
Cultura Economica, 2007), 26 and note 11.  Morga wrote: “Gobernando don Gonzalo Ronquillo 
fue electo el primer obispo de las Filipinas, llamado don fray Domingo de Salazar, de la orden de 
Santo Domingo, persona de muchas letras y santidad, que llegado a las Islas tomó en si el 
gobierno y jurisdicion eclesiastica…” For more on Gregory XIII’s papal bull on the creation of the 
diocese of Manila, see BR, Volume IV, Bull for erection of the diocese and cathedral church of 
Manila.   
35 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 9. 
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losing venture – despite its ‘entrepot’ status, the Philippines could only be 
maintained by a monthly stipend, known as situado, from Mexico – in other 
words, the money the Philippines generated as an ‘entrepot’ was less than the 
amount needed for its maintenance and upkeep; 3) and because of the trade 
facilitated by the galleons, Chinese silk was flooding the American market, and 
undercutting in price the even inferior Spanish silk.  Spanish merchants were 
pushing for the abandonment of the colony to secure the place of Spanish goods 
in the Americas.36   
Further, even before the settlement, there was already the question of 
legitimacy: Spain, it seemed, had a tenuous claim over the Philippine Islands.  In 
1529, the Treaty of Zaragoza was signed by Spain and Portugal.  It aimed to 
define the areas that fell under Spain or Portugal’s influence.  But due to either 
miscalculations or confusion over the exact location of the longitudinal line that 
divided the world between the two Iberian kingdoms, the division was far from 
clear and fixed.  Both kingdoms could make a convincing argument over where 
their “spheres of influence” ended, and where the other’s began.  The Philippines, 
located almost exactly half way around the globe from the Iberian Peninsula, fell 
along this contested area.  Eventually, modern scholars established the Philippines 
falling under the Portuguese side.  Spain, through political maneuvering, managed 
to seize the islands under Portugal’s nose.37   
Even as early as 1568, Legazpi reported to the king that trade cannot 
sustain the islands.  The following year, he declared to the viceroy of Mexico: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 William Lyle Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1959). 51.!
37 BR, Volume 1, Treaty of Zaragoza, 222-230. 
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“The Philippines ought to be considered of little importance, because at present 
the only article of profit which we can get from them is cinnamon.”38  Apart from 
the seeming scarcity of natural resources, the tropical climate made matters worse 
for the Europeans.  One Spaniard exclaimed that the climate in the Philippines 
was simply “quatro meses de polvo, quatro meses de lodo, quatro meses de 
todo.”39  (four months of dust, four months of mud, four months of both.)  An 
Italian Jesuit visiting the islands from Macau confided to a friend that, because of 
the unbearable heat and humidity, “… this country is the most apt to make a man 
a saint in a hurry.”40  Of course, hearing it Italian somewhat mitigated the gravity 
of the situation – questa è celeste per farsi l’huomo presto santo.   
With all the complications and challenges posed by the new colony, its 
abandonment seemed inevitable.   The arguments proffered by those advocating 
for letting the Philippines go were all either economic or political, an appeal to the 
practical sense of the Spanish Crown.  However, sixteenth-century Spain was just 
as much occupied with the spiritual, as much as it was with the practical.  Philip 
II, Spain’s reigning monarch, was just as much proud of being known as a 
descendant of Isabel, the Catholic, as he was of extending the Spanish Empire.  
The Philippines’ ecclesiastical community probably saw an opportunity to appeal 
to the king and convince him of the importance of the islands as a religious 
enterprise.  To this end, Bishop Salazar convoked the Synod of Manila in 1581.41   
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38 Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 23.  (Translated from Spanish by Schurz) 
39 Cushner, Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution, 4.  (Translated from 
Spanish by Cushner) 
40 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 122.  (Translated from Italian by de la 
Costa) 
41 Ibid., 23. 
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Sánchez found in this situation the perfect opportunity to abandon 
missionary activities, which as mentioned earlier he loathed, and assume a more 
prominent role in colonial society, as counselor to the bishop, representative of 
the state, and broker between the metropolis and the colonial city.  Sedeño, 
Sánchez’s superior, was obviously not thrilled with news that one of this priests 
would be taking on non-religious roles.  However, based on what Sánchez 
articulated in Mexico, and Sedeño’s realization that if not given this opportunity, 
Sánchez would retreat to a life of hermetic existence, Sedeño agreed.  Sánchez’s 
made himself available to his “high-placed friends among the laity [who]… were 
taken right to his room.”42  His counsel was sought after, and greatly valued by 
the governor, and other citizens of note, but most especially by the bishop, on 
diverse issues from justice and commerce to the welfare of the natives.43  Not 
surprisingly then, Salazar, based on the favorable impression left on him by 
Sánchez on their journey from Mexico, named the Jesuit to the council of the 
Synod, serving, together with an Augustinian and a Franciscan, as theologian and 
canonist.  In addition to his official duties, Sánchez also became unofficial advisor 
to Salazar.  The elder bishop would confer with the Jesuit sometimes until late at 
night on various problems besetting the colonial city.44   
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42 Ibid., 73.  (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa)!
43 Cólin-Pastells, Labor Evangelica, II:263. Cólin wrote: “A su compañero el Padre 
Alonso Sánchez, como persona de mucho talento, y de particular gracia para atraer a si los 
corazones de los que le comunicaba, le traian siempre ocupado en negocios publicos el 
Governador, y Obispo, y otros personajes de cuenta, particularmente el Obispo, que hallando 
necesitaban de asiento casi todas las cosas tocantes a la concienca de los encomenderos, y sus 
cobradores; y de los Ministros de Justicia; y otras que pertenecian a la Doctrina de los naturales, 
determinó poco despues de llegado, celebrar un modo de Synodo.” 
44 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 24.!
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Perhaps the most exigent of the concerns the Synod had to address was 
Spain’s claim of sovereignty over the Philippines, for on it rests the issues of 
legitimacy and rightful occupation; what title or titles does the king of Spain 
possess to justify his claim over the islands?  Despite the islands’ distance, hostile 
climate, and the economic burden it imposed on the Spanish Crown, why did it 
maintain the Philippines as a colony for more than three centuries?  Did Spain 
have legitimate claims to the Philippines to begin with?    
The Augustinians were most dogmatic in their approach to conquest as 
compared to the Jesuits.  They saw the ultimate goal of the Spanish conquest as a 
means of advancing Christianization.  The pope had the divine right to preach the 
gospel to all people and nations: “the principal if not the only reason for bringing 
the Philippines under Spanish rule was in order that the Filipinos might be 
converted to Christianity; and whatever [the Spaniards] might have to say for 
themselves, [for] killing, beating, robbing, cheating, enslaving, and otherwise 
mistreating the Filipinos did not promote their conversion.”45  The Spanish 
monarch’s legitimate claim and the colonial government’s rightful occupation and 
just administration were simply subordinate to the enterprise of evangelization.   
The Franciscans, at that time, were still new to the colony.  Having just 
arrived in 1578, they were just settling in into their new home when the synod 
was convoked.46  There was also very little, if any, documented Franciscan 
participation in the sources I consulted.  
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45 Ibid., 22.  (Translated from Spanish by de la Costa) 
46 T. Valentino Sitoy, Jr., A History of Christianity in the Philippines: The Initial 
Encounter, Volume 1 (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1985), 228.!
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By virtue of elimination, the Crown’s rationale, as determined by the 
synod, for legitimacy in its occupation of the islands, and its continued 
colonization seemed to have a Jesuit provenance.    In what is perhaps the first 
manifestation of political activity on the part of the Jesuits in the Philippines, 
Sánchez came up with practical and enforceable reasons and justifications for 
Spain’s presence in and continued occupation of the islands.  Conveniently, he 
started out with the fact that Spain was already in the Philippines.  
In Tratados del Reino de la China y Filipinas, of which a handwritten 
manuscript is housed in the Hispanic Society of America, Sánchez memorialized 
his thoughts, and positions on evangelical missions, and military excursions into 
foreign lands.  Under the section titled Razonamiento, he maintained that Spanish 
presence in the Philippines was based on the needs of the four groups of people, 
which composed the colony.  First was the community of Spaniards already in the 
islands.  As loyal subjects of the king of Spain, this community had a presumptive 
right to maintain themselves as such.  The second community consisted of the 
natives who already accepted Spanish rule and the Christian faith.  The third were 
the natives who were already conquered but yet to be converted.  And the last 
community consisted of those yet to be conquered and converted.47  Naturally, the 
first reason placed the issue of legitimacy and sovereignty on center stage.  To 
this, Sánchez invoked the divine rights of the pope, which he wrote under a 
different section called Memorial y Apuntamientos, as the infallible caretaker of 
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47 HSA, HC 363/1528, Tratados del Reino de la China y Filipinas, Razonamiento.  
Sánchez wrote in his Razonamiento: “La primera es la Republica de los españoles, la segunda los 
yndios ya pacificos, christianos, la tercera los yndios pacificos… no christianos, la quarta los 
yndios ni pacificos ni christianos. 
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the spiritual well-being of all people, to communicate to all people and nations 
about the Catholic faith, and his right to remove anyone who impedes or 
contradicts this divine mission.48   
Sánchez then proceeded to present his case for the necessary use of 
violence in conquest and evangelization.  As if responding to Martin de Rada 
himself, the influential Augustinian writer, and his objection to the use of military 
force, Sánchez argued that troops were indispensible to create a suitable 
environment for the conversion of the natives.  Quoting de la Costa:  
The divine mandate by which missionaries went forth to teach all 
nations would be meaningless if it did not imply an obligation in 
those to whom they are sent not to hinder them in the execution of 
their mandate.  If obliged, they could be compelled; by moral 
compulsion, where practicable, but if not then by physical.  This 
was what justified a military escort for the missionary, and, in a 
larger sense, a civil protectorate of the missions.  Its purpose was 
not to despoil the pagans of what was rightly theirs, whether they 
be goods of the temporal order such as property, or of the spiritual 
order, such as liberty.  Far less was it to intimidate them and in that 
sense to compel them to accept the faith.  It was merely to 
command their respect for the person and function of the 
missionary – a respect which mere moral suasion was ordinarily 
powerless to command in primitive or savage communities – and 
thus create the conditions whereby the faith could be freely taught 
and freely received.49 
 
Neatly summing up his exposition, Sánchez marshaled his arguments in 
his Memorial y Apuntamiento, and in his Razonamiento to weave a quite seamless 
and convincing narrative that made the empirical realities of the Philippines very !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 HSA, HC 363/1528, Tratados del Reino de la China y Filipinas, Memorial y 
Apuntamientos.  Sánchez wrote in his Memorial y Apuntamientos: “El primer fundamiento es que 
el Papa tiene poder y derecho y aun precepto… para predicar el Sto. Evangelio a todas las gentes y 
naciones del mundo…” He continued to enumerate more papal rights: “… el papa es señor 
absoluto del govierno espirituales de los hombres, si fuese necessario para esto modficar o mudar 
o quitar del todo el govierno temporal puede hacerlo.”  And finally, “[el papa] puede quitar las 
personas como haberes lo ha hecho por el mismo fin si se lo impiden o contradizen.”!
49 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 94.  (Translated from Spanish by de la 
Costa) 
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well suited for future evangelization.  He wrote that the Spaniards in this city 
were only few; the pacified and Christianized natives outnumbered them; and 
still, the natives who are yet to be pacified and Christianized outnumbered them 
all.  For this reason, the king had the right and the responsibility to maintain able 
and sufficient military personnel to establish peace and order for the sake of these 
communities.  What was most interesting, though, was that Sánchez went further 
than just establishing the rationality for the maintenance and use of military force.  
He elevated this heretofore tentative arrangement into an obligation of the king 
himself.50 
Curiously, though, Sánchez gave a fifth reason for the retention of the 
Philippines as a colony, which de la Costa not quite inexplicably left out. The fifth 
reason had to do with state security.  Sánchez pointed out that there was a very 
real threat of incursion from powerful foreign enemies already in the region.  The 
Japanese, the Chinese, and the English have all been spotted in the area, and did 
possess motives to claim the islands.  Sánchez reiterated that a strong and ready 
army was necessary to meet these very real challenges head on.  Spanish 
authorities of the practical persuasion perhaps responded positively to this 
argument.  A fifth argument that appealed to the more temporal and pragmatic 
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50 HSA, HC 363/1528, Tratados del Reino de la China y Filipinas, Razonamiento. 
Sánchez wrote: “Los españoles son pocos, los yndios pacificos y christianos son muchos, los 
pacificos y no christianos son muchos mas, los no pacificos ni christianos muy muchos mas.  Pues 
si por razon de alguna destos quatro comunidades su Magestad tuviesse derecho alli para tener 
gente de guerra… bueno y bastante… [su Magestad] tiene el mas justo total y derecho que se 
puede tener y escusa que por razon de todas quatro [illegible] de gente su Magestad puede y aun 
tiene obligacion de tener alli poder y fuerza.” 
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concerns of the empire would have been a welcome addition to the strictly four 
religious-cum-missionary arguments.51    
Although Sánchez’s Razonamiento could easily come across as overly 
simplistic –indeed the four communities he mentioned were everyone in the 
colony – his presentation revealed a good measure of understanding of court 
politics.  He framed the conquest and maintenance of the Philippines as a 
religious endeavor, and appealed to Philip II’s idea of a Hispanic world: 
The conquest of the Philippines was also the expression – perhaps 
the fullest expression of Philip’s vision of how the Hispanic World 
would develop under his kingship… It was a matter of deepest 
regret to Philip that Charles V had refused to confer on him the 
succession to the title of “Holy Roman Emperor,” for the title 
carried with it the unquestioned secular leadership of Christendom.  
As a mere king, Philip was only one among many monarchs in 
Europe, although perhaps the most powerful.  In the Indies, and 
more especially in the Philippines, he reclaimed his heritage… It is 
likely that in prioritizing the reconquest of the Philippines Philip 
was also expressing his determination to be unequivocally the 
leading ruler of his time – that although he was not Holy Roman 
Emperor he would rule an empire that was truly worldwide.  
Unlike Philip’s territories in the Indies, the Philippines was not 
rich in gold and silver but their possessions allowed Philip to 
extend Spanish power into Asia and to enhance and deepen his 
own stature as the leading monarch of his day.  On many levels, 
therefore, the conquest of the Philippines held profound 
importance to Philip, both as a monarch and as a man.52   
 
 Sánchez traveled to Madrid and presented his recommendations to Philip 
II and a special commission just a few months after the great loss of the Spanish 
armada to the British.  Additionally, he emphasized the outside threat from other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 HSA, HC 363/1528, Tratados del Reino de la China y Filipinas, Razonamiento. 
Sánchez wrote: “Fuera destos quatro razones… hay la quinta que aunque parece extrinsica no solo 
da este mismo derecho pero aun pone un grave obligacion y necessidad de que su Magestad tenga 
aquella tierra y christianidad fortificada y segura por razon de los enemigos estrangeros, y muy 
poderosos que suelen y pueden cada dia acedir y acabarlo todo, como son los japones…, los 
chinos…,  y navio o navios de los ingleses. 
52 Patrick Williams, “Philip II, the Philippines and the Hispanic World, “ Re-shaping The 
World: Philip II of Spain and His Time (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 2008), 15.  
! 27!
foreign powers that had their own agenda in claiming the islands for themselves.  
Under this circumstance, Philip II would have embraced the opportunity to 
redeem himself and his kingdom, and welcomed any distraction from that 
embarrassing defeat. 
Sánchez, as envoy or chargé d'affaires, made Philip II realize the 
importance of keeping the Philippines a part of the Spanish empire.  He presented 
the struggling colony as an opportunity for the monarch to prove himself worthy 
to be named “Holy Roman Emperor,” a title denied to him.  Maintaining the 
Philippines as a Spanish colony was the perfect vehicle for Philip to demonstrate 
that he was a martyr for the faith despite the burden it imposed on the royal 
treasury, despite the protestations of the Seville merchants for its abandonment, 
despite its distance, and its lack of accessible natural resources. Philip was still 
willing to support the islands as the personal cross he bore, to the detriment of his 
wealth.  By voluntarily burdening himself and his treasury with a losing venture 
for the sake of his Catholic faith, Philip not only proved himself more than worthy 
of the title denied to him, but also very deserving to be recognized as the rightful 
heir of Ferdinand and Isabella, the first of the Catholic monarchs.   
In the end, more than anything else, what Sánchez achieved was to 
informally recast the Philippines as an evangelical enterprise, and not as a 
colonial one.  He did not argue against the economic and practical reasons for 
abandoning the colony.  For he very well knew that he could not dispel them.  
Instead, he deemphasized them, and highlighted the religious, spiritual, 
missionary duties of the empire.  Obviously, he did an excellent job in convincing 
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the Spanish crown to maintain the islands as a colony: colonists never again 
seriously entertained thoughts of abandonment.  As a result, Spain remained in the 
Philippines for three hundred and thirty years, owing in no small part to Jesuit 
argumentation and reasoning. 
 
Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera  
Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (d. 1660), the 22nd governor of the 
Philippines, and the Society of Jesus had an unusual alliance.  It was unspoken, 
informal, and yet quite significant.  The entire colony knew about it, and Corcuera 
did not have any qualms in demonstrating his preference.  Perhaps what drew 
Corcuera to the Jesuits was the military origin and structure of the Society.  
Himself a soldier, Corcuera was a “knight of the Order of Alcantara, and member 
of the Council of War in the states of Flandes [sic], where he had served many 
years with great credit, being one of the most renowned captains in the siege of 
Breda.  He had afterward been master-of-camp of the port of Callao in Peru, and 
captain-general of the cavalry of that kingdom, and lastly governor of Panama.”53  
He obviously had a military disposition and also the temperament that went with 
it: he was rigid and austere, strong-willed, and quite stubborn in his judgments.54  
Unsurprisingly, his administration was known to be the most tumultuous with 
regard to state-church relationship.  Outright hostility between the archbishop and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 BR, Volume XXV, Conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 1635-1636, 
159. 
54 Casimiro Diaz, Conquistas de las islas Filipinas… parte segunda (Valladolid: Luis de 
Gaviria, 1890), 326.  Diaz wrote: “Era este caballero al paso que muy entendido, muy rigido y 
austero, muy tenaz en las determinaciones y casado con sus dictamenes, ocasion en los principes 
de los mayors yerros; pues por no ceder en lo que el amor propio prohijó por aciertos, se dejan 
llevar a cualquier precipicio.”!
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the governor was common place, and in the ensuing confusion, fractures within 
the ecclesiastical community began to emerge. 
Throughout Corcuera’s administration, the Society of Jesuit positioned 
itself strategically to take advantage of the precarious situation in the colony.  
Whereas before, as demonstrated by Sánchez, the Society chose to take an active 
and vocal role in the colonial enterprise; this time, however, the Jesuit fathers 
chose to play a supporting role in the saga taking place in the colonial stage – 
more of a passive role, true, but no less political than what they had played in the 
past.  As the state, represented by the governor, and the church, represented by the 
archbishop, battled it out, the Jesuit fathers stood on the sidelines and waited for 
the winner, to collect the spoils of the battle with him. 
Before Corcuera set foot in the Philippines in 1635, he made a promise to 
Fray Diego Collado, from the Order of the Preachers, who shared the voyage 
from Mexico with him.  Collado, although not in possession of any formal paper 
work from Rome, sailed to the Philippines to divide the colony’s Dominican 
province, and put himself as the superior of the newly formed part.  This new 
congregation, headed by Collado, would have been dedicated solely to the 
conversion of China and Japan, using only the Philippines as a base.  Corcuera 
presented, and pushed for, this proposal to the local church authorities.  Hernando 
Guerrero, archbishop of Manila, and Fray Diego de Duarte, a local Dominican 
bishop rejected it without reservation: the archbishop, because Collado lacked the 
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necessary paper work from Rome and was just relying on the promise of the 
governor, and de Duarte, because it was his province to be divided.55 
The Society of Jesus may not have been involved in any way in this 
narrative, but the outcome informed the strategy they applied during Corcuera’s 
administration.  Had the proposal been approved, the Jesuit superiors in Rome and 
the Jesuit fathers in China would have harshly chastised their Philippine 
counterparts for endangering the already precarious China mission.56  After all, 
these regional mission fields were interconnected through the constant flows of 
maritime trade and migration.  But the Jesuit fathers in the Philippines seemed to 
know that archbishop Guerrero would reject the proposal outright, for lack of 
necessary documentation.  Indeed, Guerrero’s appointment as archbishop was 
very much delayed, for the authorities in Rome took their time in preparing the 
paperwork, and sending it to the Philippines.57  With the proposal’s rejection by 
almost all sections of the ecclesiastical community confirmed, Corcuera was left 
dejected.  It was his first clash against the church, and they handed him a 
resounding defeat.  The Jesuit fathers may have seen an opportunity in Corcuera’s 
defeated state, but decided to wait a little longer before stepping in. 
It did not take long before Corcuera saw an opportunity to even the score 
with the church.  The story of Francisco de Nava, which started out as a lovers’ 
dispute, eventually escalated into one of the most controversial state-church 
conflicts, and more importantly, for this study, internal religious fragmentation in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 AGI, Filipinas, Carta de Corcuera sobre auxilio a Diego Collado 8, R, 3, N.95. Also 
see BR, Volume XXV, Conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 1635-1636, 161-162. 
56 For a short discussion on Jesuit missionary activities in China, see next section.!
57 BR, Volume XXV, Conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 1635-1636, 
160. 
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Spanish Philippines: Nava, a Spanish artilleryman, maintained an illicit 
relationship with his native slave girl.  Their affair scandalized the entire city, and 
the archbishop of Manila, Fray Hernando Guerrero, had to order Nava to sell (or 
send) the girl away.  Stricken with grief of passion, Nava proposed to marry the 
slave girl to legitimize their relationship.  The girl refused, choosing to remain a 
slave with her current owner, than to be his wife.  Blinded by disbelief, his love 
for her turned to madness.  And seeing her on the street one day, he came up to 
her and stabbed her to death.  Nava fled the scene and took refuge in a nearby 
convent.58    
Corcuera demanded that Nava surrender to the civil guards, as he thought 
that the right of sanctuary was not applicable in this case.  For some reason, 
Corcuera seemed to believe that Nava’s action amounted to treason and, 
therefore, was not protected by the right of sanctuary.  The Augustinians, in 
whose convent Nava took refuge, did not agree with Corcuera and refused to give 
up the artilleryman, a decision supported by the archbishop.  Corcuera responded 
by sending a detachment of soldiers to extricate Nava from the convent and 
deliver him for trial.  Nava was quickly sentenced to death by hanging, in a 
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58 Murillo Velarde, Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañia de Jesús, 86.  
Murillo Velarde wrote: “[el Arzobispo D. Fr. Hernando Guerrero] dió principio a esta inquietud la 
causa de Francisco de Nava, Artillero.  Aviale obligado el Arzobispo, a que vendiese, y echase de 
su poder una esclava, con quien tenia mala comunicacion con escandalo del Pueblo. Y era tal su 
passion, que porque se le bolviesen, pretendió casarse con la esclava.  Ella no quiso, eligiendo 
primero la esclavitud con dueño ageno, que al casamiento con su amo antiguo.  De aqui se 
convirtió en rabia el amor, y encontrandola un dia en la calle, le dió muerte alebosa a puñaladas, y 
luego se refugió a Sagrado.  
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special gallows erected right in front of the Augustinian church where he initially 
sought refuge.59   
This whole affair divided the Spanish population in the Philippines, some 
siding with the governor, and others with the archbishop.  The religious orders, 
particularly the Augustinians, were at the center of the controversy.  
Unsurprisingly, they, the Augustinians, together with the Dominicans, and the 
Franciscans sided with the archbishop.  The Jesuits, however, did not.  They 
reached out to Guerrero to broker a peace, and to settle ancillary issues that arose 
from this controversy.  The archbishop rebuffed the Jesuits, and accused them of 
siding with the governor (to which, de la Costa admitted: “Possibly, they did.”)60  
This fragmentation within the church unsettled the ecclesiastical 
community, especially the archbishop, who, in his wisdom, summoned all the 
superiors of the religious orders to decide whether the governor overreached in his 
authority as royal patron of the colony.  All the orders’ superiors attended, except 
the Jesuit superior, Luis de Pedraza, who in his absence sent a letter: 
Very illustrious Lord: It seems that the more the Society tries to be 
of service to your illustrious Lordship and your vicar general by 
promoting peace in the commonwealth and harmonious relations 
between its ecclesiastical and civil heads, so much the more do 
certain parties (I do not know whether with the same good 
intention) persist in misinterpreting our efforts, extracting, as the 
saying goes, poison from the antidote.  I therefore fail to see what 
useful purpose will be served by our attendance, or what difference 
it will make if our views are not heard; for whatever may be said is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 BR, Volume XXV, Conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 1635-1636, 
164-165. 
60 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 378.!
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bound to be received in the same spirit as our recent well-
intentioned attempts at mediation.61 
 
This response from Pedraza was very much at odds with the spirit of the 
Society, whose emphasis on obedience was integral in the formation and training 
of its members.  Surely, there would have been no harm if Pedraza attended the 
meeting.  The worst possible thing that could have had happened was to be 
rebuffed once again.  And even more so, if the Jesuits were truly sincere in their 
efforts to keep the peace, Pedraza would have attended the meeting, if only to 
soothe Guerrero’s hurt feelings of being betrayed by them.  Instead, Pedraza 
chose to excuse himself, and the Society, from the meeting, demonstrating a clear 
signal to Corcuera that they were on his side.   
Pedraza’s decision was really a stroke of genius: a remarkable 
demonstration of his understanding of colonial politics and the benefits of what a 
sound political strategy could bring.  He managed to deliver two important 
achievements for the Society: 1) realizing that Corcuera, through his sheer 
stubbornness and strength of will may once again attempt to send missionaries to 
China and Japan, he may very well have used this incident as leverage to dissuade 
him from doing so, or at least to keep him in check; 2) and without personally 
reaching out to Corcuera, yet still expressing loyalty to him, Pedraza essentially 
avoided accusations of ingratiating the Society with Corcuera and his 
administration. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Pablo Pastells, “Historia general de Filipinas”, In: Catalogo de los documentos, ed. 
Torres y Lanzas.  Quoted in de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 379.  (Translated from 
Spanish by de la Costa) 
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Rejection of the archbishop’s invitation did not come without harsh 
repercussions.  The archbishop responded with a vengeance that placed the 
Society’s missionary activities in jeopardy.  Guerrero prohibited the Jesuits from 
preaching throughout the archbishopric, thus confining them within their churches 
and convents; he stripped them of the title of synodal examiners, a position of 
counsel for ecclesiastical matters; and he forbade interaction between them and 
the rest of the religious community – all under penalty of excommunication.62 
The Jesuits, understandably angered by the archbishop’s excessive 
penalties, appealed to Corcuera and his advisors.  Here, Pedraza’s gamble paid 
off.  For the governor stood by the Jesuits all the way (and the way was quite 
extended and circuitous), culminating in the archbishop’s dramatic forced 
removal from office – or rather, the archbishop’s throne, where he was found 
clothed in full pontificals, complete with the blessed host in a pyx for his 
protection – and eventually, his banishment from the city.63   
With the archbishop’s departure, Jesuit privileges were reinstated.  But a 
new sense of order now fully emerged: it was the administration of Corcuera, with 
his Jesuit advisors on his side.  The other orders knew too well that their actions 
were restricted so long as Corcuera was in office; and that it would serve them !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Murillo Velarde, S.J. Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañia de Jesús, 
87.  Murillo Velarde wrote: “[el Arzobispo] se determinó que no acudiesen Clerigos, ni Religiosos 
a los Actos, Conclusiones, o fiestas, que se celebrasen en la Compañia, no los combidasen a los 
funciones, que se celebrasen en la Cathedral, o Parroquiales sugetas al Arzobispo, o a los Prelados 
de las Religiones.  Los privo su Ilustrisima de los Sermones de Tabla de la Cathedral, y que no 
pudiesen predicar en ninguna Iglesia de su Iurisdicion, y les quitó el titulo de Examinadores 
Synodales de todo su Arzobispado.  Y por Auto de veinte y seis de Octubre, mandó su Ilustrisima 
intimar a los Superiores por justas causas, que a ello le movian, que no predicasen los Iesuytas, 
fuera de sus Iglesias, en parte ninguna de todo su Arzobispado, ni en plaza, ni en cuerpos de 
guardia, por modo de platica, ni Predicacion, ni en otra manera alguna.  Lo qual cumplan 
precisamente  pena de Excomunion mayor…” 
63 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 380-381.!
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well to fly under the radar until Corcuera was replaced, which happened shortly 
thereafter.  As for Guerrero, he did come back to Manila, and to this post, but not 
without concessions.  He was a changed man upon his return – a bit more 
submissive, sometimes even deferential.  Perhaps a personal letter from Philip IV, 
the reigning Spanish monarch, tempered his character.  In it, the king strongly 
reprimanded Guerrero for his blatant disrespect of his royal patronage, and for his 
careless execution of his ecclesiastical duties.  The king made plain that his letter 
was a clear warning for Guerrero, that if he did not act and behave in a manner 
benefiting the Crown, “and that if this admonition was not enough, I would bring 
the issue to His Holiness to bring about good government and welfare for the 
colony.”64   
The letter from Philip IV to Guerrero was such a stinging rebuke for 
anyone not to have taken it seriously.  It was a clear demonstration of how much 
the king valued the cooperation and harmonious relationship of his civil and 
religious personnel throughout his empire.           
Meanwhile, Corcuera showered the Jesuits with prized appropriations, 
most notable were:  1) the entrustment to the Jesuits of the island of Mindanao for 
missionary and pastoral work;65 2) and the endowment of a royal college under 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!64!Murillo Velarde, S.J. Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañia de Jesús, 
note 340.  Murillo Velarde wrote: “Y si la amonestacion, que asi os hago, no bastare a reprimiros, 
y morigeraros, sera fuerza pasar a mayor demostracion con vos, llegando, si fuere necesario, a 
valerme de su Santidad para la execucion de ella, que sera la que pareciere mas conveniente  mi 
servicio, buen govierno, y satisfaccion publica…”!
65 AGI, Filipinas, Carta de Corcuera sobre evangelizacion de Mindanao. 8, R, 3, N. 92. 
Corcuera wrote: “… este año como otro tengo dado conquista sean ganado las yslas de Mindanao 
y Basila, y esfuerzas poner en ellas. Los ministros evangélicos fueron menester, [illegible] 
encargado estos ministerios de ambos yslas a la religion de la Compañia de Jesus.”  
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the order, named the College of San Felipe de Asturias.66  The island of Mindanao 
is the largest in the archipelago, thus giving the order more than enough room to 
grow and expand their operations.  The endowment of a royal college under the 
order’s charge, meanwhile, helped establish the order as the leading educators, a 
role to which they aspire in all their mission stations, in the colony.  These two 
grants alone were enough to sustain the Jesuits in many ways – generate income 
to support their Philippine province, keep their members occupied with 
missionary activities, and maintain, even further, their influence throughout the 
islands.      
The island of Mindanao, located in the southern part of the archipelago, 
has always been a coveted missionary area for the religious in the Philippines.  
Even in 1591, then Governor Dasmariñas realized the immense potential in that 
island: 
… the island of Mindanao is so fertile and well-inhabited, and 
teeming with Indian settlements, wherein to plant the faith, and of 
so great circumference – namely, three hundred leagues – and 
distant two hundred leagues from this island of Luzon; and is rich 
in gold mines and placers, and in wax, cinnamon, and other 
valuable drugs.  And although the said island has been seen, 
discussed, and explored (and even in great part given in 
repartimiento), no effort has been made to enter and reduce it, nor 
has it been pacified or furnished with instruction or justice – quite 
to the contrary being, at the present time, hostile and refusing 
obedience to his Majesty; and no tribute, or very little, is being 
collected.67 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 AGI, Filipinas, Carta de Corcuera sobre Colegio de San Felipe de Asturias. 8, R, 3, N. 
108. Corcuera wrote: “… la creación del colegio de S Felipe de Asturia se [illegible] al principio 
deste año de veinte collegiales hijos de los ministros de su Magestad y de los mas benemeritos 
destas yslas… que con la doctrina de los padres de la Compañia de Jesus a quien e encargado el 
otro colegio real.” 
67 BR, Volume 8, Articles of Contract for the Conquest of Mindanao, 73-74. 
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Mindanao, then, was virtually unsullied, pristine, and raw.  The appeal of 
this heretofore virgin island was understandably irresistible for the Jesuit 
missionaries who were latecomers in the colony.  Preceded by the Augustinians 
and Franciscans (and the Dominicans, if one were to consider the formal 
establishment of the orders), the Jesuits did not experience the early cross-cultural 
collision between East and West as other religious orders had encountered.  
Corcuera offered this singular opportunity to the Jesuit fathers, to experience what 
the other orders before them had experienced.  This, perhaps, after Sánchez’s 
successful persuasions to remain in the colony, was the Philippine Jesuits’ 
greatest achievement. 
Besides the obvious opportunities that the island presented – abundance in 
land, livestock, and vegetation – for both religious and secular activities, 
Mindanao posed a unique challenge to the order.  Being close to Indonesia and 
Borneo, Mindanao was home to a large Muslim population who maintained 
friendly relations with their Islamic neighbors.68  For the Jesuits, this was their 
very own version of the Reconquista (a historical event that preceded their 
founding), a holy war, which appealed to the soldier in them.  The order set 
themselves up in the northern part of the island with some military troops from 
the civil government.  There were a few clashes between the Catholic Spaniards 
and the Muslim natives, but the advantage never seemed to remain on one side.  A 
loss in one battle was followed by a victory in the next for both camps.  In the 
end, although the Jesuits were never really able to Christianize the entire island of 
Mindanao, the order was able to contain Islam to the southern part of the colony !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 BR, Volume IV, Expeditions to Borneo, Jolo and Mindanao, 150. 
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and maintain a sizable Christian population in the northern part of the island, quite 
an admirable feat given the internal division in the Spanish colonial 
administration and the support the Muslims in Mindanao received from other 
Muslims in the region.69           
Pedraza’s strategy benefited the Society during Corcuera’s administration.  
The Jesuit father perhaps understood that soldiers did not respond very well to 
strong-arming, and that the way to elicit a positive response from Corcuera was to 
demonstrate that the execution of the responsibilities of the governor’s office is of 
utmost importance.  This was exactly what Pedraza did.  In letting Corcuera carry 
out the duties of his office, Pedraza supported Corcuera’s actions, and in refusing 
to conspire against Corcuera, Pedraza validated them.  Corcuera’s trust in the 
Jesuit was implicit and indubitable, and he expressed this in a letter to Philip IV: 
The Society of Jesus serves his Majesty with much love without 
complaints; whatever is asked of them in his royal name.  Not only 
as chaplains for the galleons for the wars, but also for the wars and 
whatever else is entrusted to them.  They do not complain when 
their stipends are reduced.  They are good vassals, through good or 
mistreatments.  They do not accept novices from these islands, for 
those worthy are very few, and they easily reject those who do not 
follow the righteous path.  For this reason, your Majesty’s 
governor’s conscience is discharged from the need to be informed 
or to inquire of the quality of their members for royal service, for 
the order’s superior has adequately vetted them, and knows to 
replace them if need be.  This is not the case for the others [other 
orders].  I therefore beseech your Majesty, with all humility and 
reverence, to furnish these islands with more members from this 
order from Spain, and fewer from the other orders.  Your Majesty 
will be well served, as also will God.  I assure your Majesty, as a 
good vassal, that I make this known to you without prejudice, but 
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69 For a detailed narrative on Spanish incursions in Mindanao, see BR, Volume XXVII, 
Conquest of Mindanao, 253-305.!
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the belief that I am discharging the responsibilities of my 
conscience.70  
 
At the end of a governor’s term, a residencia took place.  A residencia is a 
quasi-tribunal, composed of the incoming governor and other Spanish officials 
that assessed the present state of affairs of the colony, and evaluated the actions of 
the outgoing governor during his term.71   
In 1644, Don Diego Fajardo arrived in the Philippines, succeeding 
Corcuera as governor.72  One of his first act as the new governor was to oversee 
the residencia of his predecessor.  Corcuera’s past conflicts with church officials, 
and his unbridled demonstration of favoritism for the Jesuits did not help in this 
inquest.  Perhaps the people whom he had slighted, offended, and neglected saw 
an opportunity to even the score.  Found guilty of misappropriation of funds, 
abandonment of governmental responsibilities, and receiving the blame for the 
loss of Spanish Formosa, Corcuera was ordered to pay a hefty fine, and was sent 
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70 AGI, Filipinas, Carta de Corcuera sobre que se envien solo Jesuitas. 8, R, 3, N.31.  
Corcuera wrote: “La Relixion de la Compañia de Jesus sirbe a su Magestad con mucho amor sin 
[illegible] jamas.  Lo que se le pide en su real nombre.  Ansi capellanes para log galeones como 
para las gueras, misiones y qualquiera otra cossa que se les encomienda sin repugnar, que se les 
reformen parte de los estipendios quando combiene.  Son vassallos para bien y mal tartar.  No 
reciben en estas yslas suxetos por que son muy raros los que prebalezen  y como su Magestad 
sabe, despiden con facilidad a los quien no andan por el camino real y derecho.  Ya esta caussa 
descarga su governador de su Magestad su concencia quando pide algun suxeto por ocupalle en su 
real servicio no teniendo necesidad de ynformarse ni inquirir las calidades del que le dan por que 
el superior lo tiene bien mirado y les conocen los pensamientos para mudarlos qundo conbiene y 
este descanso del que gobierna no le tiene con todos: por todo lo qual: supplico a su Magestad con 
toda humilidad y reverencia se sirba de mandar prober estas yslas de suxetos de españa para esta 
relixion que quantos mas embiare mas de ella y menos de las de mas.  Sera su Magestd servido y 
Dios Señor tambien, y aseguro a su Magestad como buen vassallo que ni me muebe amor ni 
passion para hacer este ynforme sino entender que descargo mi conciencia  con haverle esto.” Also 
see BR, Volume XXV, Request for Jesuit Missionaries, 298-299. 
71 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 18.!72!Murillo Velarde, S.J. Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañia de Jesús, 
136, note 338.  Murillo Velarde wrote: “El año de 1644, llegó á estas Islas, su Governador Don 
Diego Faxardo…”!
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to prison for five years.73  Never had the colony seen as much detestation directed 
toward a governor: all his property confiscated, guards placed outside his cell, and 
abandoned by everyone in his circle, Corcuera was left without money, without 
friends, and almost without recourse.74 
Curiously, throughout the whole proceedings, like it was at the beginning 
of his term, the Jesuits, which Corcuera favored so much, were silent once again – 
perhaps waiting on the sidelines to see how the pieces of the old governor’s 
crumbling administration would fall.   
 
Expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines   
Indeed, the topic on the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines is 
one of the most challenging to revisit and analyze in the nation’s history.  Not 
only are the records scant and scattered over different archives, but scholars in the 
field are also in dispute over some crucial details that led to, and that happened 
during, the actual expulsion.  Further, at least one of these respected scholars 
questions the veracity of a decisive primary source, which, when proven, could 
render the research done on the subject thus far essentially inaccurate.75 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!73!BR, Volume XXV, Conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 1635-1636, 
192.! 74!Murillo Velarde, S.J. Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañia de Jesús, 
136.  Murillo Velarde wrote: “Creciò tanto el odio, que se hizo un exemplar nunca visto en estas 
Islas con otro Governador, pues le prendieron, le embargaron sus bienes, le pusieron una 
compañia de guardia en la fuerza de Santiago, y le apartaron, y le desterraron a sus criados, 
amigos, y confidentes. Y hallandose sin dinero, sin tener de quien fiarse, sin testigos, y sin 
Letrado, acudiò como indefenso, apelando al Real Consejo de las Indias, donde esperaba, le 
oyesen con benignidad, y Iusticia…”  
75 Jose Montero y Vidal and Nicholas Cushner have sparred over the expulsion of the 
Jesuits in their respective works, which will be referenced and cited in this section.   
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More complications arise from the fact that the expulsion of the Jesuits did 
not only happen in the Philippines, nor exclusively in the Spanish dominions; 
rather, it was a concerted move of the Catholic monarchs of Europe to expel the 
Jesuits from their dominions because of the perceived threat that the Jesuits might 
pose to their power and influence.  Additionally, the expulsion decree came 
immediately after the Seven Years’ War between Spain-France and Great Britain 
(1756-1763), the proceedings of which greatly informed the general narrative of 
the expulsion of the order.  
It was, therefore, surprising to see how limited, and cursory, Horacio de la 
Costa’s treatment on the topic was.  In The Jesuits in the Philippines, de la Costa 
briefly discussed how the members of his orders obeyed without protestation the 
royal edict; how they fell in line, packed up their belongings, and wrapped up 
their missionary work in the Philippines.  For reasons known only to him, he did 
not, not even in passing, mention the origin or the reasons for the king’s royal 
decree, a very conspicuous oversight on de la Costa’s part, for the other chapters 
in his book went to great lengths in expounding events of tangential relevance to 
the primary subject matter.  His chapter on the expulsion of the Jesuits was one of 
the shortest, if not the shortest.  Further, whether ironically or sarcastically, he 
titled this chapter, “The King’s Good Servants” – an obvious commentary on 
regalism, a concept which we shall discuss soon enough, and its anti-church 
ideals.  In either case, his bitterness was palpable.76  
Still, I shall attempt to present a coherent and, if not complete, at least a 
discernible picture of the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines.  Although !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 582-595. 
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focusing on the Philippine experience, I shall begin by providing a brief account 
of the antecedents to the expulsion of the order, namely: the political and religious 
climate in Europe; and a short discussion of the Seven Years’ War that eventually 
led to the British occupation of the city of Manila in 1762. 
 
Regalism 
By the time Charles III gave the order to expel the Jesuit fathers from his 
dominions, anti-Jesuit sentiments and expressions had already been firmly 
established and demonstrated in the kingdoms of France and Portugal.  The 
members were already expelled from the Kingdom of Portugal in 1759, and from 
the Kingdom of France in 1764.77  At the heart of the matter, it seemed, was 
regalism78 – that modern European idea that an absolute monarch, guided by the 
ideals of the Enlightenment, may rule with little or no counsel from the church.79  
This idea gradually undermined the political importance of the Church in 
monarchial rule.  Isabel and Ferdinand demonstrated the first signs of regalism 
during their reign.  The Spanish royal couple began to reclaim civil 
responsibilities and privileges that the church, at the height of its power in the 
Middle Ages, had appropriated for itself.80  This measured and careful growth of 
royal power and influence continued through the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and became fully realized in the eighteenth century when Enlightenment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Jose Montero y Vidal, Historia General de Filipinas desde el descubrimiento de dichas 
islas hasta nuestros dias, Tomo II (Madrid: Est. Tip. De la Viuda e Hijos de Tello, 1894), 160-
163.  Monetero y Vidal wrote: “Los jesuitas fueron expulsados de Portugal en 1759… En 1764 
fueron definitivamente expulsados de Francia.” 
78 Regalism is the doctrine of monarchial supremacy especially over the Catholic Church. 
79 For a discussion on regalism and its implications on the expulsion of the order, see 
Fülöp-Miller, The Jesuits: A History of the Society of Jesus, 374-384. 
80 BR, Volume L, The Expulsion of the Jesuits, 270.!
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thought was sweeping throughout Europe, a fitting age for championing 
individualism, modernity, and reason, and most relevant of all the, loosening of 
the centuries-old grip of Rome on the crown and society.  Naturally, the 
institution that stood to lose the most was the church; and the organization within 
the church that stood to be most negatively affected by this development was the 
Society of Jesus, as demonstrated by the previous discussions was the most 
political and the most likely among religious organizations to be embroiled in 
non-religious matters.  Unsurprisingly, the Jesuits guarded themselves against this 
threat, and preached against its growing influence.81   
However, even the powerful Jesuit fathers could not stop the inevitable.  
Riots in Madrid involving the Jesuits made the situation worse, and Spanish court 
officials already hostile to the order succeeded in convincing Charles III to follow 
the lead of France and Portugal in expelling the Jesuits from his empire.  On 
February 27, 1767, the king issued his special royal decree, also known as the 
Pragmatic Sanction.  His reason for issuing the decree was oblique: “for great, 
exigent, just, and necessary causes that I reserved solely to my royal person.”82  
But the text of which was quite the opposite.  It was clear and unhesitating:  
I have come to order the expulsion, from all my domains of Spain 
and the Indies, and the Philippine Islands, and all else that may fall 
under my rule, of the members of the Society of Jesus, as well as 
religious such as coadjutors or lay brothers who had already 
undergone their initial profession, and the novices who would like 
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81 Ibid., 273. 
82 Manuel Danvila y Collado, Reinado de Carlos III, Historia General de España, Tomo 
III (Madrid: El Progresso Editorial, 1893), 88.  Danvila y Collado wrote: “… por gravísimas, 
urgentes, justas y necesarias causas que reservó en su [del rey] real ánimo…” 
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to follow them, and all secular activities of the Society that they 
perform in my domains.83 
 
It took the entire following month of March to plan out the execution of 
the decree.  In early April, officials dispatched copies of the king’s order 
throughout Spain, the Americas, the Philippines.  In Spain, the expulsion of the 
Jesuit fathers was swift and with vey few complications: “… the Jesuit expulsion 
was being carried out with total efficacy as is appropriate, and with the 
uneventfulness that one could hope for.  The officials from both sides have been 
complying to the word of the law, and it was very rare for a town to experience 
disruption.”84  In the colonies, however, matters were more complicated.  In the 
Philippines, in particular, although the expulsion went relatively smoothly, the 
event, and the circumstances surrounding it, revealed Jesuit political 
machinations of a different kind.   
 
Seven Years’ War 
In the years 1756-1763, Europe was in the midst of the Seven Years’ War 
between the allied forces of Spain and France, on one side, and Great Britain, on 
the other.  Rooted in acquiring the most colonies, and cornering the largest market 
share in global trade, these nations not only waged war in Europe, but also in their 
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83 Montero y Vidal, Historia General de Filipinas, 163.  Monetero y Vidal wrote: “He 
venido en mandar extrañar de todos mis dominios de España e Indias, e Islas Filipinas y demás 
adyacentes, a los Regulares de la Compañía, así Sacerdotes como Coadjutores o legos que hayan 
hecho la primera profesión, y a los novicios que quisieren seguirles; y que se ocupen todas las 
temporalidades  de la Compañía en mis dominios.” 84!Danvila y Collado, Reinado de Carlos III.  Danvila y Collado wrote: “… la expulsión 
jesuítica proseguía con toda la eficacia conveniente y con la quietud que podia desearse.  Las 
justicias de todas partes habían cumplido exactamente lo que se les encargó, y era raro el pueblo 
donde por alguna equivocación…”!
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territories throughout the world.85  This war had more lasting effects than some of 
the previous wars before it that dragged on for a longer period of time.  Within 
less than a decade, alliances in Europe drastically changed, and the map of the 
continent was essentially redrawn.  The casualties were countless, and still, in the 
end, a definitive victor was difficult to identify; although it seemed Great Britain 
benefited the most when a peace accord was reached.  The consequences of this 
war caused more than mere ripples across oceans as they reached the colonies.  
Sleepy colonial cities, usually unaware of the developments in Europe, were 
shocked to wake up to the presence of new colonizers, bringing with them an 
abrupt and swift change in government affairs and colonial administration.   
The war in Europe had a far-reaching impact on the Philippines in 1762: 
“Placing too great a confidence in their distance from Europe, the city of Manila 
was more puzzled than alarmed on the morning of September 22, 1762, when an 
armada of thirteen English vessels appeared in the Manila Bay anchorage.  The 
Seven Years War was on between France-Spain and England, but the colony was 
blissfully unaware that Spain had been dragged into hostilities by the French in 
1761.”86  The English commanders, Samuel Cornish and William Draper, 
immediately demanded surrender from the city.  Spanish city officials responded, 
“… to the effect that the vassals of Charles III were prepared to lay down their 
lives in defense of their religion and honor, [and with that] the bombardment of 
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85 For a discussion on the Seven Years’ War, see Montero y Vidal, Historia General de 
Filipinas. 
86 Nicholas Cushner, Philippine Jesuits in Exile: The Journals of Francisco Puig, SJ, 
1768-1770 (Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I. Via Dei Penitenzieri, 20, 1964), 14-15. 
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Manila began.”87  The Spaniards returned fire, and soon after, the British realized 
how “woefully unprepared the city was for war.”88  On October 4, a senior 
Spanish official, Simón de Anda y Salazar, left Manila to enlist more Spanish and 
Filipino soldiers from the provinces, and continue to resist the British from 
outside the city.  As we shall see later, this would prove to be a crucial detail to 
our narrative.  Within two weeks, Manila fell to its knees.  The British army 
disembarked from their ships; the British commanders demanded four million 
pesos, and the fulfillment of certain conditions to spare the city from sacking.  But 
apparently, even as late as the eighteenth century, the natural next step for the 
victor was a celebratory plundering of the conquered land.  Four thousand British 
soldiers and two thousands sepoys, South Indians in the military service of the 
British crown, spent forty hours pillaging Manila.  From house to house, church to 
church, nothing was left untouched.  One could only surmise what they 
discovered and took with them, for at that time, the faithful spared no expense in 
adorning the churches with gold, silver, and precious stones.  Despite the 
pillaging, the British commanders still insisted on the payment of four million 
pesos.  Only in this instance, it was in exchange for the freedom of the city.  
Manila archbishop, Manuel Antonio Rojo del Rio y Vieyra began collecting the 
four million pesos ransom money.  But Anda, the Spanish official holding out 
beyond the city limits with his army of Spanish and Filipino soldiers, refused to 
accept the terms of surrender.89  Instead, he sent an impassioned plea to Rojo for 
aid and additional supplies to supplement his war fund and the ammunitions that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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89 Ibid., 16-17.!
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he collected for his planned retaliation on the British forces.  He underscored the 
great influence wielded by the curas (parish priests) on the natives, and how this 
influence could be used to preserve loyalty to Spain.90  Almost all of the colony’s 
religious and non-religious communities voluntarily complied, and provided 
financial aid and actual soldiers to Anda’s request, seeing it as an act of patriotic 
duty.  
The Jesuits, however, were more welcoming and accommodating to the 
British forces.  They refused to participate, opting instead to establish and 
maintain harmonious relationships with the invading power.  Also, even while 
negotiations were still underway and the Spanish colonial administration was still 
very much in charge of the Philippines, the Jesuits already took down the Spanish 
flag, and hoisted the British flag in its stead.  This significant fact in the narrative 
further proved how the Jesuits were comfortable existing in that middle-ground 
between structural limitation and institutional agency.  Waving the British flag not 
only meant surrender to the invading British army, as some might interpret it to 
be, it was also a signal of a receptiveness to communicate, a recognition of a very 
realistic change, and more importantly, a willingness to be part of whatever 
political and social order that was imminent.  Not surprisingly, historian Montero 
y Vidal labeled them as traitors and accused them of sharing a common cause 
with the enemy, underscoring their failure to follow the laws of honor, loyalty and 
patriotism.91   
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Further, during the British occupation of the Manila, Spanish civil and 
religious officials suspected the Jesuits of carrying on treasonous relationships 
with the British.  Indeed, in “The Summary of Excesses of the Jesuits Sent to 
Rome for the Pope,” officials cited this illicit communications as one of the 
reasons why the Society was expelled from the colony.92  The allegation singled 
out Bernardo Pazuengos, the Jesuits Provincial during the British occupation and 
at the time of the expulsion.  He had indeed acted as an intermediary, a broker in 
the truest sense of the word, between Draper and Anda, as the two were trying to 
reach a settlement.  A very unusual aspect of this negotiation proceedings was the 
refusal of the British to commit anything at all into writing.  This caused Anda to 
be highly suspicious of the British and Pazuengos and their true intentions.93  And 
rightfully so.  Out of all the demands of the British, outrageous some of them 
might be, this refusal to put into writing the settlement agreement was perhaps the 
biggest obstacle of the negotiation proceedings between the two parties, and it 
was equally unthinkable for the Jesuits to agree to negotiate a verbal contract, 
given their meticulous recordkeeping tradition and penchant for histories, unless 
something were to be gained.   
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plaza en la medida de sus fuerzas, se mantuvieron, una vez tomada la capital, en la actitud digna 
que correspondía á su situación de vencidos; y lo mismo hicieron loas magistrados, el 
Ayuntamiento, las Corporaciones todas del orden civil y los comerciantes.  Una sola excepción 
hubo que contrastara con esta patriótico proceder, salvo el de los traidores que hicieron causa 
común con el enemigo, facilitando su triunfo; y esa excepción lamentable la ofrecieron los 
jesuitas, en cuya casa-colegio arbolaron la bandera inglesa, pasándose inicuamente al bando bando 
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reprobados por las leyes del honor, de la lealtad y del patriotismo.” 
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However speculative, it seems that the Jesuits did have something to gain 
from forging an alliance with the British, and not having any paper trail of their 
communications.  Perhaps recalling the pillaging of Manila at the beginning of the 
British occupation, the Jesuits likely wagered that a friendly relationship with the 
British would preserve their churches, which were the most adorned of all the 
religious orders:  
At a fiesta held in the Jesuits church n Manila, in 1623, the statues 
of canonized Jesuits were placed at the altar. Their garments were 
richly embroidered with gold and silver thread in intricate designs, 
and were all covered with jewels – diamonds, pearls, rubies, 
emeralds, seed-pearls, and other precious stones – arranged in such 
a manner that their luster and varied colors gave them a most 
pleasing and beautiful appearance.  On the image of St. Xavier 
were faithfully counted more than 15,000 precious stones and 
pearls, among them more than a thousand diamonds.  On that of St. 
Ignatius there were more than 20,000 jewels, and of these over 800 
were diamonds.94 
                  
Recovering even half of this Jesuit wealth would mean placing the Jesuit order 
way ahead of its rivals, who lost nearly everything.  They would have been both, 
well-connected and well-funded.  Jesuits’ posturing would have made them 
uncontested in matters of religious, even non-religious, policies in the colony.   
Indeed, the Jesuits had already used this particular political strategy in the 
past, and it would serve them well in the future.  As we shall see, similarities 
could be drawn between their actions during this event and those of the post-war 
period – their slow but clear support for the victors within shifting alliances had 
contributed to the success of the order in the Philippines, and the Jesuits hoped 
that these same moves would once again for them.  They were essentially banking 
on history repeating itself. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 BR, Volume L, Expulsion of the Jesuits, 305 n. 149.!
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 The British occupation of Manila met an anti-climactic end.  While the 
negotiations between Spain and Britain were still happening, the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris on February 10, 1763 essentially ended the Seven Years’ War.  
Rumor flew fast that the British already received their orders to evacuate the city, 
and Anda was quick to recognize the opportunity in this development.  He stalled 
in his negotiations.  The continued posturing of the British general and his local 
intermediary (which happened to be the Jesuit Bernardo Pazuengos) lasted for 
more than a year.  Eventually, in March of 1764, the British fleet raised anchor 
and sailed for India; Anda then marched triumphantly back into the city. 
   
Expulsion 
Throughout the centuries, the Society of Jesus had exercised its extra-
ecclesiastical activities – in varying capacities, to varying degrees, and with 
varying results.  Inevitably, the Jesuit fathers’ participation in court affairs led to 
disagreements and clashes with the non-religious members of royal courts in 
Europe, which eventually grew to intense resentment against the order:  
The hatred of ministers, favourites, mistresses, and intriguers 
against the Jesuits had by this time grown powerful in all Catholic 
courts, for the holders of these positions, in which, before the days 
of Jesuit court confessors, it had been possible to exercise 
unlimited control over the sovereigns, saw their positions more and 
more seriously endangered by the influence of the fathers.  It was 
inevitable that people in every country who were being adversely 
affected by the Jesuits should stretch out their hands to one 
another, over the frontiers, and should unite in a firm league 
against the order.95 
   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!95!Fülöp-Miller, The Jesuits: A History of the Society of Jesus, 374-375.!
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Under the guise of regalism and against the backdrop of the Enlightenment, these 
high court officials rejected religious interference in state affairs and, through the 
suppression of the order, successfully extirpated Jesuit elements from governing 
councils.   
Charles III’s Pragmatic Sanction, mentioned earlier, reached Manila on 
May 17, 1768.  It came by way of Acapulco through the viceroy of Mexico.  
Addressed to Governor Jose Raón from the Conde of Aranda in Madrid, it 
contained the text of the king’s decree, and instructions on how to proceed with 
the order.96  The execution of the order was allegedly swift and efficient, and 
followed the Conde’s instruction to the letter.  From the account provided by Fr. 
Francisco Puig, whose diary provided a first-hand narrative on how the order had 
received the news and how the Jesuit fathers had responded to the decree, it 
seemed the whole affair went without incident: On May 19, 1768, Puig wrote that 
at nine-fifteen in the morning, the college of San Ignacio in Manila was occupied 
by two companies of soldiers who stationed themselves in the inner part of the 
college.  The commanders of the troops ordered for the doors of the church to be 
locked from the outside, and confiscated all keys and guarded all the exits.  That 
same morning, Don Manuel Galvan, a Spanish court official of the Real 
Audiencia (Appelate Court) of Manila and entrusted appointed judge of the 
governor arrived at the college of San Ildefonso, with other Spanish officials to 
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serve as witness to the announcement of the royal decree.97  At this point, Puig 
couldn’t have relayed it better himself: 
As these were all present and the whole community gathered 
together in obedience at the sound of the bell, he informed and 
imposed upon us the royal decree of banishment with the 
occupation of all of our property, as well as the other royal 
dispositions about our exile contained in the Pragmatic Sanction.  
All of these were read as well as the decree of the king in which 
His Majesty authorized the Conde de Aranda to be in charge of the 
execution of the expulsion of all Jesuits from the kingdoms and 
domains of the king.  The said royal ordinance was solemnly 
announced in all the streets and posted in the usual public places of 
the city, the governor adding a decree which ordered under pain of 
grave penalties that anyone who held or knew anyone who held 
Jesuit property or who owed anything to them was to present 
himself to the authorities within two or three days to make such 
information known.  And the Archbishop… published an edict in 
which he ordered that all his subjects under pain of major 
excommunication late sententiae should punctually obey the said 
decree of the governor.  After hearing the royal disposition with 
due reverence Fr. Provincial with the whole community obeyed 
with all submission, bowing their heads to the sublime and 
inscrutable designs of God.98 
 
 The events following the announcement of the royal decree and its 
execution seemed to have gone, as mentioned earlier, without incident.  By 
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August 1, 1768, the first batch of Jesuit fathers set sail for Mexico, then overland 
to Havana, and from its port, crossing the Atlantic to their final destination in 
Italy.99 
However, this seamless, uneventful narrative of the expulsion of the 
Jesuits from the Philippines is highly suspect.  Normally, the Jesuits would have 
expressed some sort of disapproval, or intention to appeal, or outright 
disobedience, much like what transpired in Mexico.100  Therefore, the disquieting 
uneventfulness by which the expulsion took place invites a closer look at the 
actual event and the circumstances surrounding it. 
The most compelling reason why the Jesuits acquiesced to the expulsion 
decree was that they received advance warning from the colonial government, 
enabling them to put their affairs in order.  Indeed, if they could not fight the 
expulsion order, then the next best thing was to be well-prepared for it.  
Allegedly, the Jesuit fathers were able to burn incriminating documents, put away 
their wealth for safekeeping, and arrange for a very comfortable and smooth 
journey back to Europe.  All this was made possible by a network of Jesuit 
operatives in place in colonial Manila, a group of people who, although not 
members of the order in the strictest sense, maintained allegiance to the Jesuits 
through membership to lay organizations affiliated with or sponsored by the 
Society. 
The idea of lay people affiliated with a religious order started in thirteenth-
century Europe.  Given the supremacy of the Catholic Church at that time, it was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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no surprise that the laity would want to be more involved in the activities of the 
Church.  Identifying with a particular order and its particular religious tradition 
provided lay people a deeper and more meaningful connection with their faith, 
and thus, the Catholic Church.  This was achieved without completely divesting 
themselves of their secular lives and pursuits.101  Thus, a formal means for the 
laity to lead a more religious life was established through the formation of 3rd 
order (the 1st and 2nd orders being the regular priests and the nuns, respectively) 
brotherhoods or lay organizations.  These lay organizations functioned as a 
secular arm, enabling the orders to attract people who could not fully commit to 
their religious vows: the vows of chastity and poverty were understandably 
difficult to keep, and obedience was a close second.  But loyalty, which was not a 
religious vow, could be solicited.  And for the Jesuits, with their emphasis on 
education, eliciting and nurturing loyalty from people should come quite 
naturally.102     
The members of these organizations carried on with their ‘regular’ lives, 
but they also clearly followed a particular form of religious devotion, depending 
on the religious order to which they are affiliated.  They were, in essence, hybrids 
– part religious, part laity – who were just as comfortable in convents and 
churches, as they were in the governor’s mansion or any non-religious 
environment.  The Jesuits saw this as an opportunity to legitimately extend their 
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influence further into non-religious affairs.  By placing their brothers into 
positions of power or actively courting people in these positions, the Jesuits were 
essentially growing a large network, beyond the confines of their convents and 
churches,  that could grant favors to the order and be called in its service in times 
of need.  The following paragraphs are devoted into exploring the validity of the 
idea of a Jesuit network that protected the order and its members from the full 
impact of the expulsion decree. 
When the governor of the Philippines, Jose Raón, received the special 
royal decree of Charles III regarding the expulsion of the Jesuits, he allegedly sold 
the contents of the message to the Jesuits for a huge amount of money: “Raón, an 
extraordinarily venal man, who had little scruple over enriching himself, saw in 
this instance an opportunity to exploit the situation by revealing to the Jesuits the 
secret of their expulsion in exchange for a substantial amount of money.”103  
Owing to this covert deal, not only were the Jesuits able to keep jewelries and 
precious objects that could easily be transported, but they were also able to 
safeguard documents that were potentially incriminating and damaging to their 
order.104  Following this illicit exchange, Raón supposedly had his secretary Juan 
Antonio de Cosío draft a response to the Conde de Aranda of his faithful and 
expedient execution of the Charles III’s royal decree, which he dated July 1768.  
This document carries on its shoulder the entire Jesuit argument “that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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governor had duly executed the royal commands regarding the Jesuits, in 
accordance with his [Charles III’s] instructions; and this was sent to [the Conde 
of] Aranda, with a letter in which he threw the blame upon Galvan [a Spanish 
court official in the Philippines] for any defects which might be found in the 
conduct of the expulsion.”105 Montero y Vidal questions the veracity of this 
document, not as a forgery, but as a blatant false statement of Raón addressed to 
the Conde of Aranda to cover his wrongdoing.106 
In as much as Raón was the most venal man in the colony, he was not the 
only corruptible one.  Surrounding him were some members of the appellate 
court, also functioning as a quasi-advisory council for the governor, whose moral 
wherewithal could not stand the weakest of breezes.  They were Juan Antonio 
Cosio, Francisco Henriquez de Villacorta and Domingo Blas de Basaraz.  Cosio 
was a fiscal and the governor’s personal secretary; Villacorta was the court’s 
auditor; while Basaraz was a court judge.  As cited earlier, Raón did not 
experience a crisis of conscience in amassing wealth through whatever means 
possible.  And together with Cosio, who was “more subtle and malevolent than 
can be expressed,”107 Manila was left in the same decrepit state in 1768, as it was 
in 1763, when the British left for India.108  These two men maintained no 
allegiance to anyone, and masterfully pitted various organizations in colonial 
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society against each other, as a form of distraction from their illicit activities.109  
Villacorta and Basaraz, however, maintained relations outside of that little circle.   
Villacorta was a recognized friend of the Society of Jesus.  Besides having 
taken the side of the Jesuits regarding disputes against the state or the church in 
the past, he censured the archbishop for the latter’s insistence on episcopal 
visitation, which meant interference in the way the Jesuits and other regular 
orders run their parishes.110  Basaraz, one of the resident magistrates, was more 
than a mere friend to the order.  He was a Jesuit brother as he was a member of 
that order’s lay organization.111  (The name of the lay organization was not 
mentioned in any of the sources I consulted but all identify Basaraz as a 3rd order 
Jesuit brother.) 
Thus, given Basaraz’s close relationship with the Jesuit fathers, he was the 
most likely person to have facilitated the covert transaction between the governor 
and the Jesuits.  Establishing who made the first move, however, whether it was 
the governor looking to make an unexpected profit or the Jesuits sensing an 
impending disaster for their order based on transoceanic whispers, is difficult to 
determine.  It could have also been Basaraz himself who initiated the exchange, 
recognizing a mutually beneficial outcome for both the governor and the Jesuits.  
Indeterminacy notwithstanding, the transaction proved how effective the Jesuit 
political network was in an early modern colonial setting. 
Basaraz’s demonstration of loyalty to the Jesuits did not stop there.  
Allegations of his interference in the process of expulsion immediately surfaced !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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after the last Jesuit priest left the colony.  Among them were: Basaraz allowed the 
Jesuits to take papers and books from their archives which had already been 
seized; proceedings of the expulsion, to the extent to which he had oversight, 
went according to the preference of the order; he clandestinely met with members 
of the order; and he permitted them to take money and documents with them on 
their trip to Mexico.112 
Indisputably, Basaraz’s actions softened the harsh decree of expulsion 
issued by Charles III.  He was part of a larger Jesuit political machinery that the 
order carefully established through the years to buttress, if not shield, them from 
the attacks that would have inevitably come as the Society expanded in power and 
influence.  It could have very well been an Augustinian or Franciscan or any of 
the other orders occupying the seat of magistrate judge in Raón’s advisory 
council.  But it was a Jesuit, and that was not happenstance.  Basaraz was part of a 
quasi-sleeper cell, to use modern parlance, whose tentacles extended far, wide and 
deep.  No doubt, the many organizations and institutions the Society established 
and founded – the colleges, the charities, lay organizations – form part of this 
complex Jesuit network, acting as the order’s eyes, ears, and sometimes even 
muscle. 
Simon de Anda y Salazar, the Spanish hero of the British invasion of 
Manila, succeeded Raón as governor of the Philippines.  As was customary, the 
incoming governor conducted a residencia of the outgoing head of the colony.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!112!Montero y Vidal, Historia General de Filipinas, 207.  Montero y Vidal wrote: “… dio 
a los Jesuitas los Papeles y libros que quisieron de los ocupados cuyos Archivos les franqueó; que 
en los asuntos que ocurrian a estos procedia segun ellos querian: que todos los dias los empleaba 
en hablar en secreto, y encerrado con los Padres; que les permtió sacar dinero, y papeles quando se 
embarcaron…”!
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Anda found Raón, Cosio, Villacorta, and Basaraz guilty of various treasonous 
crimes, especially regarding the proceedings of the expulsion of the Jesuits.  The 
former governor found it necessary to salvage his reputation by drawing up and 
pointing to documents that exculpate him of any wrongdoings.  But Raón, 
Villacorta, and Basaraz all died of sickness (which, due to the slow 
communication between Madrid and Manila and the conditions of the cell, was 
not uncommon during this time).  Cosio was the only one who lived long enough 
to serve his sentence.113  He died in exile in Africa.114   
To further cast doubt on the Jesuits’ surprise over the expulsion decree, 
the Jesuits were very comfortable in the journey back to Europe, which means 
they had enough time to adequately prepare for the voyage back home.  Even 
Cushner admitted: “But the Jesuits were well prepared for their trip.  They 
travelled “first class” for 250 pesos each (taken from their confiscated funds) and 
were well supplied before leaving Manila.  Among the rations given the 130 
Fathers were 24,000 eggs, 428 picos of wheat, 3,000 chickens and 50 large pigs.  
They were also allowed eleven Chinese servants who had to return to the 
Philippines once they reached Acapulco.  Among the servants were two cooks 
and one barber.”115 
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 Conclusion  
 The members of the Society of Jesus clearly played various roles that 
benefited their order by advancing its agenda, protecting its interests, and 
shielding it from hostile elements.  As ambassadors, counselors, confessors, 
brokers, the Jesuit fathers were able to influence policy indirectly, leaving their 
religious integrity intact.  Working closely with people in very high places, the 
Jesuits were sometimes seen as more political than religious, as the real power 
behind the throne.116   
In the colonial setting, the Society was at the forefront of evangelization.  
Realizing that a policy of diplomacy and accommodation was the best way to 
spread Christianity to non-believers, it was more effective than the other orders in 
attracting followers.  This resulted in its enviable position as the wealthiest and 
most influential religious order in the Philippines, which, in the Philippines, said a 
lot, as the power of the church was recognized to be much stronger than that of 
the state. 
With wealth, influence, and the favor of the colonial government, the 
Society of Jesus established its supremacy over the Philippine Islands.  Indeed, it 
took a Pragmatic Sanction, a special royal decree of utmost importance in exigent 
situations, from the king to take it down.  But even then, the order was able to rely 
upon the extensive network it had established to buttress it from the full impact of 
that external force.    
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 Further still, the Jesuits demonstrated a level of political sophistication 
that even the colonial civil authorities did not possess.  They were not merely 
political; they were strategically political.  The political tactics and strategies they 
implemented were skillfully devised and constructed to suit specific conditions.  
Truly, their decision to have a more active part establishing Spain’s sovereignty 
and legitimacy over the Philippines, and then switching to a more restrained, 
subordinated role during the Corcuera administration, was nothing short of 
masterful.  Their participation in these two dramatically different instances 
unequivocally displayed their political adroitness and talent in politics.   
 What is more, the Society of Jesus did value the end over the means, the 
destination over the journey.  Based on its moral philosophy, as discussed at the 
beginning of this paper, it probably did not matter to the Jesuit fathers that some 
of their means or journeys were not as Christian as they should have been.  They 
probably saw the importance of a well-funded and well-connected organization to 
do god’s work, as they interpreted it.  In the Constitution of the order, Ignatius, its 
founder, affirmed the Society’s need to win “the good will and charity of all,.. 
especially of those whose favorable or unfavorable attitude toward it is of great 
importance for opening or closing the gate leading to the service of God and the 
good of souls.”117  This passage clearly articulates the order’s stance on matters of 
moral ambiguity.  The Jesuits believed that things are not always black or white; 
decisions, methods, courses of actions – not entirely moral or Christian – are 
made and followed. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Ibid., 5.  
! 62!
If the Society of Jesus was indeed more political than its rival religious 
orders in the early modern setting, then what was further proven here is that the 
order was able to recalibrate its involvement as needed, to tailor its practices to a 
specific situation, and to recognize when to be on the offensive and when to be on 
the defensive.  This suggested a deeper understanding of the interconnectedness 
brought about by conquest and evangelization.  Furthermore, the Jesuit fathers 
were not limited by their immediate geographical and temporal conditions.  They 
saw past these physical barriers; they planned ahead, and were not discouraged by 
any setbacks.  As missionaries, they were exemplary; as politicians, they were 
enviable.  In the early modern world, where religiosity and pragmatism comingled 
in a precarious balance, these Jesuit fathers, indubitably, had the upper hand over 
their rivals and proved themselves to be remarkably successful in managing their 
global religious enterprise in an Asian colony.      
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